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Economists have debated whether and why the designated hitter (DH) rule in North 
American major league baseball led to an increase in hit-batsmen. We use data from 
Japan's professional baseball leagues, the Pacific League (DH rule) and the Central 
League (no DH rule), to re-examine this question. Our empirical findings reveal increases 
in hit-batsmen in the Pacific League after we control for the DH’s effect on team batting 
performance. We argue that the DH rule induced changes in managerial defensive 
strategies that led to more hit-batsmen.  Subsequent rule changes reduced the 
effectiveness of these strategies.  
 
 
JEL: D81, J28 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Professional sports provide economists with opportunities to test 
theoretical predictions with a rich array of performance data. As the rules of 
the game are clearly defined for individual players as well as for 
organizations such as teams and leagues, sports statistics are often used to 
study rule changes and their consequences. Examples of   
such investigations include the effects of rookie draft rules on team 
competitive balance in Daly and Moore (1981), Fort and Quirk (1995) and 
LaCroix and Kawaura (1999), and free agency and the allocation of player 
talent in Eckard (2001). 
  This paper examines the effects of the designated hitter (DH) rule in 
professional baseball on team defensive strategies. The DH rule allows 
another player on the team roster to bat and run the bases in place of the 
pitcher, thereby ensuring that the pitcher does not have to bat.    In North 
American Major League Baseball (MLB), the American League (AL) 
introduced the DH rule in 1973 and continues to use it, while the National 
League (NL) has never used the rule. Using MLB performance data, Goff, 
Shughart and Tollison (1997), hereafter GST (1997), found that AL batters 
  1were hit by pitches more frequently than their NL counterparts during 
DH-rule  seasons.  They  attributed  this difference to moral hazard by 
pitchers, arguing that pitchers in the DH-rule league can hit opposing 
batters of their choice with less concern for personal retaliation as the rule 
exempts them from facing opposing pitchers at the plate.1 Trandel,  White 
and Klein (1998), hereafter TWK (1998), offered a new estimation equation 
to measure the DH’s effects on hit-batsmen, updated the sample of GST 
(1997) by adding seven seasons (1991-1997), and found that the DH’s effect 
on hit-batsmen was statistically insignificant.  TWK  (1998)  also  questioned 
the moral hazard story by arguing that a pitcher merely acts as an agent of 
his team’s manager and that retaliation is rarely directed at pitchers 
themselves.2  They stressed that AL batters are on average better hitters as 
the DH rule replaces a weak-hitting pitcher with a big-hitting slugger and 
argued that pitchers have a lower opportunity cost of hitting sluggers than 
                                                  
1  Batters can, however, charge the pitcher on the mound, and opposing pitchers can also 
retaliate by hitting other players on the pitcher’s team.    Since the pitcher cannot bat, 
opposing team managers could order increases in these responses to limit dangerous 
brush-back pitches against their players. 
 
2  In spite of the popular belief that retaliation is part of the game, researchers have 
been unable to identify statistically significant retaliatory responses.    Trandel (2004) 
argued that retaliation should result in a positive correlation between the number of 
opposing batters hit by a team’s pitchers and the number of hit-batsmen on the team.   
Using MLB team data, he found no evidence of statistically significant correlations 
between these two variables.    Levitt (1998) also found no evidence that pitchers who 
frequently hit opposing batters are hit more often by opposing pitchers. 
  2pitchers.    The lower opportunity cost of hitting sluggers should lead to more 
hit-batsmen in the AL than the NL.    In response to these criticisms, Goff, 
Shughart and Tollison (1998), hereafter GST (1998), acknowledged that the 
DH effect disappears when the sample period is extended through the 1997 
baseball  season.  They  hypothesized  that the NL expansion in 1993 and the 
players’ strike in 1994-95 may have diluted NL pitching and led to more hit 
batsmen in the NL, thereby diminishing the size and statistical significance 
of the DH effects in the AL. 
This paper has two objectives, the first of which is to contribute to the 
debate over the effects of the DH rule on hit-batsmen by using data from the 
two Japanese professional baseball leagues.  As  in  North  American  MLB, 
one league in Japan—the Pacific League—introduced the DH rule in 1975 
and continues to use it, while a second league—the Central League—has 
never used it.    The parallel rule structures in Japan and North America 
allow empirical inquiry into the effects of the DH rule with a new data set, 
one which we believe is superior to the MLB data set.    Unlike MLB, 
Japanese professional baseball did not have a major player strike during the 
1958-2004 seasons (our sample period) and had a fixed number of teams (six 
  3per league) from the 1958 through the 2004 seasons.3 Japanese  baseball 
experienced a two-game player strike in September 2004 but this pales in 
comparison to the strike in 1994/1995 in North American MLB which 
resulted in the loss of the 1994 post-season and continued into the 1995 
season.4    The more stable institutional environment for Japanese 
professional baseball teams should serve to improve the reliability of 
regression estimates of the DH’s impact on variables such as the differences 
in the number of hit batsmen between the two leagues, as variations in hit 
batsmen cannot be due to changes in the number of teams or a player strike.   
The second objective of the paper is to provide regression-based tests of the 
various hypotheses offered to explain the increase in hit-batsmen under the 
DH rule.    We find that the DH rule prompted a shift in team defensive 
strategy, which led to more aggressive pitching and more hit-batsmen. 
The article continues in Section II by establishing the effects of the 
                                                  
3  Operating with 8 teams between 1901 and 1960, the AL expanded to 10 teams in 1961, 
12 teams in 1969, and 14 teams in 1977. Also operating with 8 teams between 1901 and 
1960, the NL expanded to 10 teams in 1962, 12 teams in 1969, 14 teams in 1993, and 16 
teams in 1998.     
 
4  None of the empirical results in our paper are affected by whether our sample period 
for Japanese baseball data includes the strike year (2004) or is truncated in 2003.    The 
MLB 1994/1995 strike began on August 12, 1994, resulted in the loss of the 1994 
post-season, and was not settled until April 25, 1995 when play resumed after a federal 
judge ordered that the 1995 season begin under the rules of the expired contract.     
  4DH rule on hit-batsmen and investigating whether the hit-batsmen 
differential across leagues can be explained by the improved batting line-up 
that results from replacing a pitcher with a designated hitter. Section III 
discusses the factors behind pitchers’ more aggressive tactics under the DH 
rule.    The responses by team managers to the introduction of the DH rule 
and to subsequent induced rule changes are presented as a potential source 
of the change in pitchers’ behavior. Section IV summarizes the findings. 
 
II. THE DH RULE AND CHANGES IN HIT BATSMEN ACROSS LEAGUES 
Figure I provides rates of hit-batsmen (hit-batsmen/10,000 plate 
appearances or HB rates) for the Pacific and Central Leagues since 1958.5 
When the sample period is divided into two sub-periods by the Pacific 
League’s adoption of the DH rule in 1975, the average HB rates are greater 
in the post-DH period in both leagues.    In the Central League, the mean HB 
rate was 68.4 before 1975 and 75.0 thereafter, while in the Pacific League, 
the mean HB rate increased from 73.3 before 1975 to 81.7 thereafter.    The 
difference in the mean HB rate was 6.6 (with standard deviation of 13.8) 
                                                  
5  GST (1997) and TWK (1998) both use “at-bats” as a basis to normalize hit batsmen 
statistics. We use “plate appearances” because hit batsmen occur as part of plate 
appearances. At bats exclude hit batsmen. 
  5after 1975 and 4.9 (with a standard deviation of 10.0) before 1975.    Using a 
t-statistic test for difference in means, the null hypothesis that the average 
HB rates are equal in both leagues cannot be rejected at the 5 percent 
significance level for both the pre-DH and DH periods. 
During the DH period, another rule change occurred in the Pacific 
League that could have affected the number of hit batsmen. In July 1982, the 
Acting Chairman of the Pacific League issued a memorandum to league 
umpires, stating that “dangerous balls” should not be tolerated.    In 1989, 
both leagues formalized the 1982 Pacific League memorandum by adding a 
clause to the official rulebook prohibiting a pitcher from throwing “dangerous 
balls.”6    An umpire was given the authority to remove the pitcher or both 
the pitcher and his manager from the game when he judged that a pitcher 
had intentionally thrown at a batter.    In the same year, the Pacific League 
adopted its own four-pronged guidelines providing umpires with more 
concrete guidance on how and under what circumstances to penalize pitchers 
and their managers for the occurrence of “dangerous balls”.7 
                                                  
6  The “dangerous balls” clause was added to the 1989 Official Rulebook as Section 
8.02(d).    This section (8.02) enumerates a list of prohibited actions for pitchers. 
 
7  These four items are: (1) when umpires judge that a pitcher has thrown intentionally 
to a batter, the pitcher and his manager should be immediately removed from the game. 
  6We note that the timing of the 1982 and 1989 rules changes is 
roughly consistent with the timing of the declining gap in the HB rate during 
the DH period.    After the issuance of the Pacific League “dangerous balls” 
memorandum in 1982, the gap between HB rates in the two leagues 
eventually disappeared over the course of the next seven seasons (1982-1988), 
with almost all of the catch-up occurring between 1985 and 1988.    In the 
1989 season the Pacific League’s HB rate fell (slightly) below the Central 
League’s HB rate for the first time since the introduction of the DH rule in 
1975.    The impact of the “dangerous balls” rule is also supported by the 
change in the mean difference of HB rates across leagues.    The average 
difference in HB rates was 4.9 prior to the introduction of the DH rule 
(1958-1974), which increased to 16.2 during the DH period before the 
dangerous ball rule was introduced (1975-1988).8  A   t-test reveals that the 
difference in HB differentials across these two periods is statistically 
                                                                                                                                                  
This applies even when the ball did not actually hit the batter; (2) when the ball hits the 
batter after players in the dugout have verbally instigated their team’s pitcher to throw 
at batters, the pitcher and his manager should be immediately removed from the game. 
This applies even when the ball did not actually hit the batter, if the umpires judge that 
the pitcher has been engaged in dangerous pitching; (3) a warning is declared when a 
ball hits the batter on the head regardless of the umpires’ judgment whether the pitch 
was intentional.    After the warning, any pitcher who hits batters on the head should be 
immediately removed from the game; and (4) umpires have the authority to give 
warnings to any pitcher they judge to be engaged in dangerous pitching, in which case 
item (3) above applies. 
8 The  standard deviation was 10.0 and 11.3 for respective periods. 
  7significant at the 1 percent level.    After the dangerous ball regime is 
introduced (1989-2004), the mean differential in HB rates across the two 
leagues falls to –1.7 (with a 10.0 standard deviation).    A t-test reveals that 
the mean differential in HB rates during the dangerous balls period 
(1989-2004) is not statistically different at the 5 percent level from the mean 
differential in HB rates during the pre-DH period.9 
We follow these simple difference in means tests with regression 
analyses designed to test both for the existence of changes in hit-batsmen 
across the three periods with different rules (no DH, DH, and DH with 
dangerous balls rule) and for the rationale underlying these changes in team 
behavior. 
 
Effects of Designated Hitter Rule on Total Hit Batsmen 
  Our first set of regression analyses focuses on documenting changes 
in the annual number of hit batsmen in the two leagues over time. First, we 
replicate GST’s (1997) original regression specification (1) using the 
                                                  
9  The t-statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no HB differentials between the 
pre-DH period (1958-1974) and DH period with no dangerous balls rule (1975-1988) is 
2.929. The corresponding statistic for pre-DH period (1958-1974) and DH period with 
the dangerous balls rule (1989-2004) is 1.903; it is statistically insignificant at the 5 
percent level but statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  8Japanese data from 1958-2004. 
(1) Dif-HBt = β0 + β1DH + β2Dif-PAt + εt 
The dependent variable, Dif-HBt, is the difference in hit-batsmen across the 
two leagues in year t. The DH dummy is one for the Pacific League between 
1975 and 2004, and Dif-PAt stands for differences in plate appearances 
across the two leagues.    Second, we rerun the original GST specification 
with two DH dummy variables that represent DH rule regimes with and 
without penalties for “dangerous balls” in the following form: 
(2)   Dif-HBt = β0 + β1DH1 + β2DH2 + β3Dif-PA  + ε t
                                                 
t . 
One dummy variable, DH1, covers the 1975-1988 DH period, while a second 
dummy, DH2, corresponds to the 1989-2004 DH period with the “dangerous 
balls” rule.10  Third, we conduct the same analyses of the normalized (for 
plate appearances) hit-batsmen interleague differences (Dif-HBNt) using 
TWK’s revised regression specification:   
(3)  Dif-HBNt = β0 + β1DH + εt 
(4)   Dif-HBNt = β0 + β1DH1 + β2DH2 + εt . 
OLS regression results with these specifications are presented in 
 
10  We also run this analysis with DH2 specified to begin in 1983, which is the season 
after the Pacific League memorandum on dangerous balls was issued.    The results are 
broadly similar. 
  9Table I.    As in GST (1997) and TWK (1998), we correct for first-order 
autocorrelation. Specifications with a single DH dummy, (1) and (3), have low 
explanatory power (R2) are statistically insignificant (F-statistic).    In 
addition, estimated coefficients for the DH variable are not statistically 
different from zero at the 5 or 10 percent levels.    These results do not 
support the proposition that the DH rule led to an increase in hit-batsmen.   
Dividing the DH period into two, however, produced results in equations (2) 
and (4) that identify positive and statistically significant estimated 
coefficients for DH1 at the 5 percent level.    This implies that the DH rule, 
before specific penalties for hitting batters were imposed on pitchers and 
their managers in 1989, was associated with an increase in the number of hit 
batsmen in the Pacific League. 
  It is possible that the observed impact of the DH on hit-batsmen is 
merely picking up the effect of the better batting lineup with the DH rule on 
the number of hit-batsmen.    As TWK (1998) and Levitt (1998) point out, 
adoption of the DH rule allows a team manager to have a stronger batting 
line-up by replacing a weak-hitting pitcher in the batting line-up with a 
designated hitter with a high slugging average.    Aggressive pitching to 
  10sluggers comes with the expected cost of an occasional hit batsman and with 
the expected gain of fewer big hits, due to the effects of brush-back pitches on 
the batter’s concentration and stance at the plate.    To the extent that a team 
manager chooses to order pitchers to engage in aggressive pitching more 
often to designated hitters than to pitchers, the number of hit batsmen 
should be greater with the DH rule.   
To test the TWK hypothesis that introduction of the DH rule 
improves the batting line-up and hence leads to more hit-batsmen, we 
specify the following regressions and run them using aggregate league data 
and team data: 
(5)  HBt = β0 + β1DH + β2PAt + β3SAt + εt 
(6)  HBt = β0 + β1DH1 + β2DH2 + β3PA  + β t
                                                 
3SAt + εt 
where HB is hit-batsmen per season, PA is plate appearances, and SA 
corresponds to slugging average.    SA is included in the specification to 
isolate the effects of batting line-up differences across seasons and teams.11 
League and team data are treated as panel data for the 1958-2004 seasons, 
 
11  In order to identify the effect of the DH rule on batting performance, the number of 
bases is regressed on the DH dummy and at-bats for the Pacific League for 1958-2004 
seasons. The adjusted R-squared is 0.577, and the DH coefficient is 1144.09 with a 
t-statistic of 6.66. The size of the DH coefficient is 11.47% of the average number of 
bases during the pre-DH seasons (9973.29), which supports the hypothesis that the DH 
rule results in a better batting line-up. 
  11and regressions estimates are obtained using the fixed-effects framework. 
Estimated coefficients for both league and team panel specifications 
are presented in Table II.    The estimated coefficients on slugging average 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both team and league 
regressions.  While  the  estimated  coefficients on the DH and DH2 dummies 
are not significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level, the estimated 
coefficient on the DH1 dummy is positive but statistically insignificant with 
league data and positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
with team data. These results reinforce our earlier results that the DH rule 
led to changes in the number of hit-batsmen until rule changes imposed 
larger penalties on managers and pitchers using “dangerous balls” strategies.   
The league results also provide support for the TWK hypothesis but the more 
disaggregated team results show that the DH rule was an independent 
source of hit-batsmen even after the effect of a stronger line-up is taken into 
account in the regression.   
 
III. THE DH RULE AND TEAM PITCHING STRATEGY 
  The preceding analyses demonstrate that the DH rule in the Pacific 
  12League was associated with more hit-batsmen and that a better batting 
line-up was responsible for some but not all of the increase. As GST (1997, 
1998) discussed, the additional effects of the DH rule on hit-batsmen could be 
due to pitchers who maximize their own (rather than team) utility by 
throwing at the batters of their choice. This is an explanation based on moral 
hazard by pitchers who no longer have to face retaliation at the plate. We are 
skeptical of this argument because the pitcher is under the direct 
supervision of his manager, who is watching every pitch and every play from 
the nearby team dugout.    Since it is the manager who decided which players 
play and for how long, his pitching behavior should reflect his manager’s 
defensive strategy in a game.    A pitcher who pays attention to his own 
preferences rather than the manager’s orders is likely to be penalized by the 
manager and team.    While self-indulgent behavior can be found in any 
organization, we do not believe it is important in this context. 
We formulate the following scenario regarding the pitching strategy 
of a baseball team.    Compare the strategies of managers of high-quality 
(winning) and low-quality (losing) teams:    It is the manager of a losing team 
who is more tempted to use hit batsmen as a means of minimizing the 
  13damage incurred by opposing teams’ sluggers.    A winning team does not 
have to resort to this strategy as much as a losing team does, since it has a 
better group of pitchers and a stronger batting line-up.    For a losing team, 
one obstacle to this strategy is that the team’s pitchers may fear personal 
retaliation at the plate from the other  team’s  pitchers.  Managers  pay 
attention to these concerns as they affect the ability of pitchers to carry out 
their assigned duties.    Once the DH rule is adopted and pitchers can 
completely escape this particular form of retaliation, a losing team’s manager 
finds it easier to instruct his pitchers to engage in aggressive pitching which 
includes brush-back and beanball pitches.12 
  In order to test whether the DH rule prompted such a change in 
strategy, we conduct an analysis of the relationship between team 
performance and pitching strategy in the Pacific League. The proxy for the 
strategy is the “HB-ratio” that is the ratio of the number of hit batsmen a 
team’s pitchers throw at other teams’ batters to the number of hit batsmen 
                                                  
12  A beanball is a ball thrown at an opposing batter’s  head.  It  should be noted that the 
hypothesis of aggressive pitching by poorly performing teams under the DH rule rests 
on the potential of personal retaliation and does not require that retaliation actually 
takes place. The correlation coefficient between team pitcher-HBs and team batter-HBs 
(in terms of their divergence from league averages) for Japanese teams in 1958-2004 is 
–0.145, which does not provide evidence of retaliation. This is parallel to Trandel’s 
(2004) findings from MLB data. 
  14its batters receive from other teams’ pitchers. The more aggressive a team’s 
pitching is, the greater this ratio becomes. The HB-ratio for Pacific League 
teams is regressed according to the following specification: 
(7)  HB-ratioit = β0 + β1WINit  +   εt 
where WINit is team i’s winning percentage in year t. Fixed-effects regression 
estimates are first obtained for periods before and after the adoption of the 
DH rule, and the DH period is further divided into two by the introduction of 
the penalties on “dangerous balls” in 1989. 
  As is demonstrated in Table III, there was no statistical relationship 
between team pitching strategy and team performance in the pre-DH period 
(1958-1974) as the extremely low explanatory power of the regression 
implies. Under the DH rule (1975-2004) the regression specification becomes 
statistically significant as its F-statistic improves.    The estimated 
coefficient on winning percentage is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level.    The results are robust to the split of the DH period into 
two periods marked by the passage of the dangerous balls rule in 1989.    We 
therefore conclude that a losing team tends to engage in more aggressive 
pitching than a winning team. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
  15that the DH rule motivates managers of poorly performing teams to use hit 
batsmen as a defensive substitute for good pitching to sluggers. This strategy 
shift could be the source of the greater number of hit batsmen under the DH 
rule even when we control for the other team’s slugging average. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
  The results from our regression analyses of Japanese professional 
baseball league data show that the DH rule led to more hit batsmen until 
rule changes in 1989 prohibited pitchers from intentionally throwing 
dangerous pitches to a batter.    It is notable that the impact of the DH rule 
can be isolated even after we control for the improved team batting line-ups 
in the Pacific League after the introduction of the DH rule.    These new 
findings using Japanese data stand in contrast to TWK’s (1998) findings 
using North American MLB data—that the increase in hit-batsmen in the 
American League is well within the range that would be observed due to 
improvements in the batting line-ups of AL teams. 
  Our result does not, however, necessarily lend support to the 
hypothesis that the increase in hit-batsmen in the Pacific League is due to 
  16moral hazard by pitchers.    The DH rule also provided managers with a new 
tool to formulate their competitive strategies and may have altered 
managers’ defensive strategies, particularly managers on losing teams with 
poor talent. 
  Economists have extensively studied North American professional 
baseball partly due to an intrinsic interest in the sport and partly due to the 
massive array of team and player performance data that are publicly available 
for analysis. In contrast, Japanese professional baseball has been largely 
ignored by economists.13  This is unfortunate, as the massive and 
comprehensive data compiled for Japanese baseball players and teams could 
provide economists with a rare natural experiment that could provide insights 
into how robust the findings using U.S. data are.    In this paper we have shed 
new light on the DH rule debate with Japanese data and have identified an 
alternative explanation that has been considered in the literature using U.S. 
data. 
                                                  
13  See, however, La Croix and Kawaura (1999), Ohkusa (1999), and Ohtake and Ohkusa 
(1994). 
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1958- 1974 Mean HB
Pacific: 73.3
Central: 68.4
1975- 2004 Mean HB
Pacific: 81.7
Central: 75.0
 TABLE I. OLS Estimates of Hit Batsmen Differences between Pacific and Central 
Leagues: 1958-2004 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Dependent HB  Difference        Normalized  HB  Difference       
Variable   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
DH   7.16     3.45 
  (0.37)     (0.56) 
 
DH1     34.48**     11.50** 
    ( 2 . 4 8 )      ( 2 . 6 9 )  
 
DH2     -16.22     -5.78 
    ( 1 . 2 1 )      ( 1 . 3 9 )  
 
Plate App.  0.002    0.01 
Differences (0.31)    (1.09) 
 
Intercept 14.39    12.22   3.74   4.44 
  (0.87)   (1.17)   (0.55)   (1.50) 
 
Adjusted R2  -0.042   0.239   -0.015   0.249 
F-statistic  0.09   5.71   0.32   8.45 
 
rho   0.466   0.102   0.461   0.121 
D.W.   2.080   1.842   2.046   1.852 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.    Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 
5% (**) level. 
 TABLE II. Fixed-Effects Estimates of Hit Batsmen by League and by Team: 1958-2004 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Dependent  League Hit Batsmen   Team  Hit  Batsmen   
Variable   (5)   (6)   (5)   (6) 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
DH   -3.51     0.97 
  (0.24)     (0.69) 
 
DH1     14.08     4.09** 
    ( 0 . 8 1 )      ( 2 . 4 3 )  
 
DH2     -15.38     -1.27 
    ( 0 . 9 7 )      ( 0 . 8 2 )  
 
Plate   0.01*   0.01**   0.01***   0.01*** 
Appearance (1.82)    (2.41)   (3.73)   (4.71) 
 
Slugging  718.30*** 665.41*** 81.33***  73.84*** 
Average   (3.99)   (3.69)   (5.83)   (5.26) 
 
Intercept -264.42** -332.82***  -35.87*** -47.60*** 
  (2.27)   (2.75)   (3.38)   (4.28) 
 
Adjusted R2  0.259   0.289   0.142   0.159 
F-statistic  9.92   8.44   27.28   23.46 
N   94   94   564   564 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.    Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 
1% (***) and 5% (**) levels. TABLE III. Fixed-Effects Estimates of HB-Ratio in the Pacific League 1958-2004 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
  Pre-DH   DH  Rule 
  Period   Period   (DH1)   (DH2) 
    1958-1974 1975-2004 1975-1988 1989-2004 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
 
Winning   -0.38   -1.12***   -1.69***   -1.54*** 
Percentage  (1.02)   (3.00)   (2.91)   (3.21) 
 
Adjusted R2  -0.001   0.070   0.043   0.114 
F-statistic  1.04   8.97   8.46   10.30 
N   102   180   84   96 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.    Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 
1% (***) level. 